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1I. Introduction
The predicted effect of financial incentives on human behavior is a sharp theoretical dividing line
between economics and other social sciences, particularly psychology. The difference is
manifested in alternative conventions for running experiments. Economists presume that
experimental subjects do not work for free and work harder, more persistently, and more
effectively, if they earn more money for better performance. Psychologists believe that intrinsic
motivation is usually high enough to produce steady effort even in the absence of financial
rewards; and while more money might induce more effort, the effort does not always improve
performance, especially if good performance requires subjects to induce spontaneously a
principle of rational choice or judgment, like Bayes’ rule.
The effect of incentives is clearly important for experimental methodology. In addition, varying
incentives can tell us something about human thinking and behavior which should interest all
social scientists, and may be important for judging the effects of incentives in naturally-occurring
settings (e.g., compensation in firms, or public response to taxation).
Ultimately, the effect of incentives is an empirical question. Indeed, it is an empirical question
which has been partly answered, because many studies have explored the effect of varying levels
of incentive in many different tasks. In this paper we summarize the results of 74 studies
comparing behavior of experimental subjects who were paid zero, low or high financial
performance-based incentives.
The studies show that the effects of incentives are mixed and complicated. The extreme
positions, that incentives make no difference at all, or always eliminate persistent irrationalities,
are false. Organizing debate around those positions or using them to make editorial judgments is
harmful and should stop.
The presence and amount of financial incentive does seem to affect average performance in
many tasks, particularly judgment tasks where effort responds to incentives (as measured
independently by, for example, response times and pupil dilation) and where increased effort
improves performance. Prototypical tasks of this sort are memory or recall tasks (in which
paying attention helps), probability matching and multicue probability learning (in which
keeping careful track of past trials improves predictions), and clerical tasks (e.g., coding words
or building things) which are so mundane that monetary reward induces persistent diligence
when intrinsic motivation wanes. In many tasks incentives do not matter, presumably because
there is sufficient intrinsic motivation to perform well, or additional effort does not matter
because the task is too hard or has a flat payoff frontier. In other tasks incentives can actually
hurt, if increased incentives cause people to overlearn a heuristic (in problem-solving "insight"
tasks), to overreact to feedback (in some prediction tasks) to exert "too much effort" when a low-
effort habit would suffice (choking in sports) or when arousal caused by incentives raises self-
consciousness (test-taking anxiety in education).
In the kinds of tasks economists are most interested in, like trading in markets, bargaining in
games and choosing among gambles, the overwhelming finding is that increased incentives do
not change average behavior substantively (although the variance of responses often decreases).
2When behavior does change, incentives can be interpreted as shifting behavior away from an
overly socially-desirable presentation of oneself to a more realistic one: When incentives are low
subjects say they would be more risk-preferring and generous than they actually are when
incentives are increased.
I. Capital, labor, and production
Take a subject’s point of view. An experiment is an activity for which subjects volunteer
(usually), which lies somewhere between playing a board game with friends and doing a
crossword puzzle. Subjects come to the experiment with knowledge and goals. Earning more
money is presumably one goal. But subjects surely have other goals as well: They may be
intrinsically motivated to perform well, may want to appear intelligent by making quick
decisions, sometimes try to amuse other subjects or fulfill the experimenter’s implicit
"demands", and may want to exhibit socially desirable behavior (like generosity and risk-taking).
In economic terms, we can think of a subject’s goals as an objective function he or she is
trying to maximize. Knowledge is "cognitive capital". The requirements of the task, which we
call "production", are also important for determining performance. Psychologists ask: How well
can subjects with particular knowledge, in a specific task, achieve their goals? Equivalently,
economists ask: How well can subjects maximize their objective function, given available
capital, and a particular production function?
Previous discussions in experimental economics have focussed almost exclusively on the
objectives of minimizing effort cost and maximizing monetary reward, because economists
instinctively assume thinking as a costly activity. For example, in Smith and Walker's (1993)
"labor theory", subjects respond to increased incentive by expending more cognitive effort,
which is presumed to reduce variance around responses. The simplest kind of labor theory rests
on two intuitions: (1) Mental effort is like physical effort-- people dislike both, and will do more
of both if you pay them more; and (2) effort improves performance because, like scholars,
subjects have access to a wide range of all-purpose analytical tools to solve experimental
problems. This simple view ignores two important factors-- intrinsic motivation (some people
like mental effort, and those people disproportionately volunteer for experiments!); and the
match between the analytical skills possess and the demands of the tasks they face. Effort only
improves performance if the match is good. This latter omission is remedied by introducing the
concepts of capital and production into the labor theory.
Capital
Cognitive psychologists distinguish "declarative knowledge"-- facts about the world-- from
"procedural knowledge"-- a repertoire of skills, rules and strategies for using declarative
knowledge to solve problems. Knowing that Pasadena is northeast of Hollywood is declarative
knowledge; knowing how to read a map of Los Angeles is procedural knowledge.
Experimenters are usually interested in the procedural knowledge of subjects, not the declarative
knowledge. (In a sense, good instruction-writing ensures that all subjects have the declarative
knowledge to understand how their decisions affect their performance.) We take procedural
knowledge and "cognitive capital" to be roughly the same. `Pieces’ of capital are a variety of
3tricks or approaches to solving an experimental task, like the many specialized tools on a
carpenter’s tool belt or a cook’s knowledge of foods, kitchen utensils, and recipes. In economics
experiments, cognitive capital includes heuristics like anchoring on a probability of .5 and
adjusting, rules of thumb like cutoffs for rejecting ultimatum offers, analytical formulas or
algorithms, personal skills or traits (e.g., unusual ability to concentrate, terrific short-term
memory, perceptual skill, high `need for achievement’), domain-specific procedures ("always
wait until the end of the period to buy") and so forth.
An important feature of capital is how it is acquired. In the time horizon of a laboratory
experiment, subjects probably acquire capital through learning-by-doing rather than from
learning-by-thinking. As Smith (1991) wrote,
Many years of experimental research have made it plain that real people do not solve
decision problems by thinking about them in the way we do as economic theorists. Only
academics learn primarily by reading and thinking. Those who run the world, and support
us financially, tend to learn by watching, listening and doing. (P 12).
Furthermore, useful cognitive capital probably builds up slowly, over days of mental
fermentation or years of education rather than in the short-run of an experiment (1-3 hours).
(Cognitive psychologists say it takes 10 years or 10,000 hours of practice to become expert at
difficult tasks; see e.g., Ericcson and Smith, 1991). However, incentives surely do play an
important role in inducing long-run capital formation.
Production
A task’s production requirements are the kinds of capital necessary to achieve good performance.
Some tasks, like clerical ones, require simple attention and diligence. (Trading in markets might
be like this, but includes perhaps patience and memory.) Other tasks, like probability judgments,
might use analytical skill or domain-specific knowledge. Complicated games might require
special analytical devices like backward induction.
Adding capital and production to the labor theory has several general implications.
First, capital variables-- like educational background, general intelligence, and experience with a
task-- can have effects that are as strong as the effect of financial incentives (and interact with
incentives). If experimenters manipulate incentives because of a prior belief that incentive effects
are large, perhaps they should spend more time measuring and manipulating capital variables as
well.
Second, asking how well capital is suited to the production task at hand is important because
poorly-capitalized subjects may perform worse when incentives are stronger (just as running too
fast, without proper stretching or coaching, can injure muscles).
Third, the nature of the production task matters because some tasks are simply easier (or have
"floor effects")-- that is, almost every subject has some kind of capital which enables good
production-- while others are hard ("ceiling effects"; few subjects have the necessary capital).
4Fourth, elements of experimental design can affect the production function and alter performance
systematically. Simplicity of instructions, stimulus display, opportunities for communication,
and so forth, can affect performance and may also interact with incentives. (For example, tasks
that are designed to be engaging may increase attention, lowering the "cost" of effort or raising
intrinsic motivation, and reducing the marginal effect of higher financial incentives.)
Fifth, considering capital and production together implies that in some tasks, people should
sacrifice short-run performance to learn better decision rules-- to acquire cognitive capital useful
for production-- which raises afresh empirical question of whether people sacrifice earning for
learning optimally (see Merlo & Schotter in press).
II A Review of Studies
The concepts of capital, labor, and production were introduced to provide a loose framework
within which empirical effects of incentives can be understood.
The empirical heart of our paper is an informal review of 74 studies comparing behavior of
experimental subjects who were not paid, or were paid low or high financial incentives,
according to their performance. The studies are those we knew of and which came to our
attention, so the sampling is nonrandom. However, we also sampled every article which varied
financial incentives published in the American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of
Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics from 1990-98. More careful surveys of
studies were done by Bonner et al (1996), Hertwig and Ortmann (1998), and Jenkins et al (1998);
we compare our conclusions with theirs below. Because of the opportunistic sampling we used,
the reader is entitled to regard the paper as an informed essay or collection of conjectures, which
may or may not prove true after a more careful meta-analysis of studies (and further research).
Studies were included if they satisfied two rules: (i) Incentive levels were reported and varied
substantially within the study; and (ii) the study reported enough detail of the level of incentive
and size of any performance effects to enable us to classify the effects of incentive. Thus, studies
were excluded if they lacked a within-study control group or underreported details of incentive
effects. As far as we could tell, subjects knew the payoff functions they faced.
Studies satisfying the control and reporting criteria (i) and (ii) are summarized in Table 1. The
studies are classified in several groups-- incentives help mean performance, incentives hurt mean
performance, incentives have no effect on mean performance, incentives affect behavior but
behavior cannot be judged by a performance standard, and incentive effects are confounded with
effects of other treatments. The table reports the authors, task, and incentive level in each study.
The rightmost column summarizes the effects of the incentive levels given in the third column.
The table was constructed by the first author and every entry was checked by a research
assistant.
An example will show how to read the table. In the Awasthi & Pratt (1990) study there were two
performance-based incentive levels, denoted 0 and L. Zero means choices were hypothetical so
there was no performance-based incentive (usually subjects were paid a few dollars for
participating). L means the stakes were low (they were paid $2.42 for answering each judgment
5problem correctly); H denotes higher stakes. For comparability, all payments were inflated to
1997 dollars using the GDP deflator.
Note that L and H do not denote absolute levels but simply lower and higher levels within a
study. The absolute levels are generally reported as well. This reporting convention does make it
difficult to compare across studies, since the L level in one study may, in absolute terms, be
higher than the H level in another study. However, this convention does make it possible to tell
whether, in general, raising stakes from L to H improves performance (regardless of what those
levels are).
The table reports that the fraction of subjects making errors was 46% in the 0 condition and 41%
in the L condition, so higher incentives reduced error slightly. The fourth column also notes that
L subjects took more time to complete the task (5.7 minutes instead of 4.2), and the reduction in
error caused by higher incentive, from 44% to 21%, was greatest for subjects who were high in
"perceptual differentiation" (measured by a psychological test).
Rather than reviewing each study, we will describe some regularities in the several categories of
results, which are summarized in Table 2.
When incentives help: There are many studies in which higher incentives do improve mean
performance. Table 1 suggests that incentives appear to help most frequently in judgment and
decision tasks (they also sometimes hinder performance in this class of tasks). They improve
recall of remembered items, reduce the effect of anchoring bias on judgment, improve some
kinds of judgments or predictions, improve the ability to solve easy problems, and sharpen
incentives to make zero-profit trades in auctions or do piece-rate clerical work.
An example is Libby and Lipe (1992), who studied recall and recognition of 28 internal firm
controls which accountants might look for when auditing a firm (e.g., "spoiled checks are
mutilated and kept on file"). Subjects then had to recall as many of the controls as they could (in
the "recall" task) or recognize controls seen earlier, on a new list which included some spurious
controls (in the "recognition" task). Some subjects were paid a flat fee ($2) for participating (the
0 condition) and others earned 10 cents for each item correctly recalled or recognized, along with
a $5 bonus for each of the top five subjects. Incentives caused subjects to work harder (about
three minutes longer). Incentives also caused subjects to recall more items correctly (12.0 vs.
9.8) but did not improve recognition much (16.3 vs. 15.8). Libby & Lipe suggest that incentives
do induce more effort, but effort helps a lot in recalling memories, and only helps a little in
recognizing an item seen previously. Their study is a glimpse of how incentive effects can
depend dramatically on the kind of task a person performs.
Kahneman & Peavler's (1969) study is notable because it measures a physical manifestation of
the effort induced by higher incentives-- pupil dilation. Their subjects learned a series of eight
digit-noun pairs from an audiotape (e.g., "3-frogs"). Then subjects were told a digit (e.g., 3) and
asked to say which noun had been paired with that digit. For some digits, subjects had a low
incentive to guess the noun correctly (1 cent) and others had a high incentive (5 cent). When
subjects were told the incentive level on each trial, their pupils dilated (they grew wider in
diameter). When incentives were high dilation was larger (pupils changed in diameter from 3.99
6millimeters to 4.04) than when incentives were low (3.97 to 3.98). The difference in amount of
dilation in the low and high incentive conditions is tiny but highly significant (t=3.2, p<.01).
High-incentive subjects also got more nouns correct (55%) than low-incentive subjects (18%).
A simple count of studies in which incentives affect mean behavior (versus those in which
incentives don’t matter) shows that a disproportionate number of effects result from raising the
level of incentives from 0 (i.e., subjects choose hypothetically and are paid no performance-
based incentive) to a low level L. Raising incentives from some modest level L to a higher level
H is more likely to have no effect. This suggests that while adding some incentive to otherwise-
hypothetical choices often matters, experiments which then multiply stakes by 2, 4, or 20 do not
produce similar boosts in performance. It may be too early to call for an end to such (expensive!)
experiments but the results in Table 1 suggest little reason to think the effects of very large
incentives will be substantial.
When incentives hurt: In a few tasks, incentives appear to actually hurt. All of these are
judgment or decision tasks. Many of the studies establishing these negative effects are likely to
be controversial, and the effects are often unclear for various methodological reasons.
(Researchers itching to study incentives empirically might start by trying to replicate some of
these results.)
A striking example is Arkes, Dawes & Christensen (1986). Their subjects were told grades for
each of 20 students and were asked to predict whether the students won honors. In one condition,
students were given a simple formula for predicting honors from grades, which was right 70% of
the time. (Students were told how accurate the formula was, and were warned that outpredicting
the formula is difficult.) No-incentive subjects generally used the formula and got 66% right.
Incentivized subjects, paid $.10/trial, tended to abandon the formula and actually got fewer right
(63%). While their effort was not measured directly, one can interpret the incentivized subjects'
abandonment of the simple formula as an exertion of effort; but their extra effort hurt
performance, rather than improved it.
Ashton (1990, groups 5-6) got the same result in a similar setting, prediction of bond
ratings. This phenomenon is related to the fact that experts in many domains-- law, medicine,
graduate admissions, psychiatry-- make worse predictions than simple formulas based on
observable, quantitative predictors (see Dawes, Faust & Meehl, 1989, for a review of nearly a
hundred field studies). In these domains formulas require little effort and predict well. Increased
incentives cause people to exert more effort, adding their own judgment to the formula (or
ignoring it), leading to predictions which are often worse. In terms of capital and production,
these sorts of judgment tasks require simple calculations focussing on only a few cues. When
"too much capital" is used, it backfires.
Hogarth et al (1991) found that when subjects were stiffly penalized for forecasting inaccurately
in a two-variable "multicue learning" task, the effect of incentives was to encourage more
experimentation which lowered overall performance. In two studies on `insight’ problems like
the Luchins water-jug task, Glucksberg (1962) and McGraw and McCullers (1979) found that
subjects were slower to have the insightful experience which gave a correct answer if they were
paid. Since these problems require subjects to `break set’ and think unorthodoxly to find the
7answer, the negative effects of incentives means highly-incentivized subjects may be exerting
more effort, but more effort blinds them to the surprising answer.
Incentives might also hurt when added incentives make people self-conscious about an activity
which should be automatic (though no studies in Table 1 use these tasks). The phenomenon
appears as "choking" in sports (professional basketball players sink significantly fewer free-
throw shots in playoff games than in regular-season games; see Camerer, 1998), and test-taking
anxiety in education (see Baumeister, 1984), and can be traced to Yerkes and Dodson (1908).
When incentives make no difference:
The most common result is that incentives did not affect mean performance. These include
studies on market trading, bargaining, and some studies of risky choices.
Incentives appear not to matter when the marginal monetary return to increased effort is low.
Effort returns will be low when it is either very easy to do well, or very hard to improve
performance (known in psychology as "floor" and "ceiling" effects). For example, in bargaining,
Camerer (1990), Forsythe et al (1994), Guth, Schmittberger & Schwarze (1982), Neelin,
Sonnenschein & Spiegel (1988), and Siegel & Fouraker (1960) found no substantial differences
in average behavior. Think of bargaining behavior as a simultaneous expression of a person's
degree of self-interest (or oppositely, an expression of fairness or altruism) and a person's
understanding of their bargaining power in a particular situation. In making alternating offers for
division of a "pie" that shrinks with each rejected offer, for example, people may make
nonequilibrium offers because they are not purely self-interested, or because they cannot
compute the equilibrium offer. Incentives probably make little difference in these experiments
because they do not substantially alter either the degree of self-interest or a subject's
understanding. The game-theoretic solutions to these games are either so transparent (a "floor",
in the case of ultimatum bargaining) or so difficult to figure out-- a "ceiling" for sequential
bargaining requiring backward induction-- that only specific training will induce equilibrium
offers (in the case of multi-stage bargaining).
Floor or ceiling effects are common in other tasks where incentives make little difference. For
example, Kahneman, Peavler & Onuska (1968) studied pupil dilation and performance in a task
where subjects heard four-digit strings, then repeated back the string, adding either 0 or 1 to each
number. They found that pupils dilated more when incentives were higher-- a sign that subjects
were working harder-- but there was no increase in accuracy because subjects got 88% right even
with low incentives (i.e., performance was close to a ceiling at 100% accuracy). Samuelson &
Bazerman (1985) found the opposite in a study of bids in a notoriously difficult "acquire-a-
company" problem. Bidding for real money did not improve performance (but did raise the
variance) because discovering the optimal bid is extremely difficult.
It is worth noting that in many experiments, financial incentives might appear to have little effect
because subjects are intrinsically motivated to perform well, so money adds little extra
motivation. When subjects volunteer, for instance, they surely self-select for high intrinsic
motivation. In extrapolating results to nonvolunteer populations, like students who are essentially
forced to participate for course credit or survey respondents approached in malls or called at
8home, one should be careful to generalize from the results of experiments in which subjects
volunteer.
In many of the studies where incentives did not affect mean performance, added incentives did
reduce variation (Grether, 1981, noticed this fact early on). For example, Fiorina & Plott (1978)
studied five-person committees choosing a point in a two-dimensional policy space. Each subject
earned an amount of money which depended on how close the committee's point was to the point
they preferred. Subjects in the committees earned 1-5 cents (low incentive) or $1-3 (high
incentive) for every unit that the committee's point was closer to their preferred point. High
incentives did not change the mean deviation from the core point predicted by cooperative game
theory very much, but did reduce variance around the core point dramatically. Similarly, Irwin,
McKee, McClelland, Schulze and Norden (in press) found that higher incentives in the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak method for eliciting valuations did not affect the mean value elicited, but did
reduce the standard deviation by half.
When incentives affect behavior, but there is no performance standard:
There are quite a few studies in which incentives do affect behavior, but there is no normative
standard for optimal behavior so one cannot pass judgment on whether incentives "improved"
performance per se. About half these studies involve choices among gambles. In three studies
incentives had no effect on risk attitudes. When there was an effect, with one exception
(Edwards, 1953), the effect of actually playing gambles was to make subjects more risk-averse
(see also Weber, Shafir, and Blais, 1998, for a meta-analysis with the same conclusion). In
studies with "dictator games"-- players dictate an allocation of a fixed sum between themselves
and another subject-- subjects usually kept substantially more when choices were real rather than
hypothetical. Finally, there are a large number of studies comparing hypothetical choices to buy
everyday products with actual choices. Only one study is included in our sample (Cummings,
Harrison and Rutstrom, 1995; but see Harrison and Rutstrom (in press) for a review of forty
studies, mostly in environmental valuation). In their study, subjects were asked whether they
would buy a juicer, chocolate, or a calculator. About three times as many subjects said they
would buy, as actually did (31% vs. 9%). Overreporting purchase intention is quite familiar in
marketing studies, and in political science (people overreport both intentions to vote, and
whether they actually did vote).
A related example is probability matching in binary learning experiments. In these experiments,
in each of many trials subjects bet on which of two lights (say, red or green) will light up.
Suppose the red light comes on 60% of the time, and each trial is independent (though subjects
usually don’t know that). Then the profit-maximizing strategy is to always bet red, but subjects
typically choose red between 60% and 100% of the time, roughly matching the relative
frequency of choosing red with the probability of red. When incentives are raised, subjects move
toward the profit-maximizing prediction, choosing red more often (Siegel, Siegel & Andrews,
1964; Castellan, 1969). This behavior can be explained by a model in which subjects find the
task boring (it is!) and therefore get utility from varying their response, or get added utility from
winning a bet on the less likely underdog color (green). As incentives are raised, subjects
consume less variation and earn more profit, accepting some boredom in exchange for more
money (see Smith and Walker, 1993).
9In all these cases, we can interpret subjects as having some nonfinancial goal-- to appear risk-
taking (gambles) or generous (dictator games), to please the experimenter by intending to buy
something (purchase experiments), or avoid the boredom of making the same choice hundreds of
times (probability matching)-- which is partially displaced by profit-maximization when
incentives are increased. This kind of incentive effect is fundamentally different from the effect
of incentives in inspiring greater effort, clearer thinking, and better performance.
When incentives are confounded with other treatments:
Table 1 includes a few studies which confounded incentives with another treatment variable so
that it is impossible to tell whether financial incentive, or the confounded variable, caused a
change in performance. In some cases confounds are deliberate; for example, in exploratory
designs on market experiments, investigators often adjust "exchange rates" for converting points
to money, and confound those changes with simultaneous changes in parameters. Table 1 reports
only cases where confounds appear to be unnoticed. We cannot draw conclusions from these
studies, but we include them for completeness and to caution experimentalists who are interested
in studying incentive effects about the need for proper control. For example, Wright & Aboull-
Ezz (1988) had students judge probability distributions of GMAT scores, age, and starting
salaries of recent MBAs. Students in the incentive condition were paid according to an incentive-
compatible scoring rule. No-incentive subjects were not told about the scoring rule. The
incentivized subjects did have lower absolute errors in probability than the no-incentive subjects
(.04 vs. .07), but the difference could be due to the scoring rule rather than to financial incentives
per se. (To break the confound, a control group which are given scoring-rule feedback about
their judgments but not given any incentive for accuracy, and a control group which is
incentivized but given no scoring rule, could be compared to the first two groups.)
In Kroll, Levy & Rapoport’s (1988) study of portfolio allocation, increased incentives may have
increased subjects’ risk-aversion, which may explain why the high-incentive subjects chose
portfolios which are closer to optimal. This example is particularly disturbing because their study
is prominently published (in the American Economic Review) and is often cited as evidence that
higher incentives produce better performance.
 
What others have said
Our paper is closely related to four others. (Very interested readers should read all three.) Smith
and Walker (1993) present a formal "labor-theoretic" framework, and argue from a sample of 31
studies that increased incentives tightens the distribution of errors around the theoretical
optimum. While increased incentives do seem to reliably reduce variance, we argue that the
effects of incentives are perhaps more complicated than that, and add capital and production
(informally) to the central solo role that effort plays in their framework.
Many of our basic conclusions were arrived at independently by Bonner, Young, and Hastie
(1996), who conducted a more thorough review of a wider array of research. Their review
classifies results according to five types of incentive schemes-- flat rates (no performance-based
incentive), piece rates, variable rates (stochastic piece rates), quota systems, and tournaments.
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They find little systematic difference among these types of incentive. They find frequent positive
effects in domains where little skill is required and effort improves performance-- pain
endurance, vigilance or detection (e.g., spotting typos), and clerical or production tasks. They
find weaker evidence for positive effects in memory and judgment or choice tasks, and
essentially no positive effects in problem-solving. Bonner, Young, and Hastie also highlight the
important role of skill (or capital, in our terms), calling it "the most important, yet neglected
moderator of the effects of incentives on performance" (p 40).
Hertwig and Ortmann (1998) include a small discussion of incentive effects in a paper
contrasting experimental practices in economics and psychology (cf. Camerer, 1996). Their
paper includes a census of available studies (10 in number) from 1987-97 of the Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making, and uses a standard meta-analytic measure of effect size (eta) to
permit comparison across studies. They conclude that increased incentives almost always have a
modest effect, and call for "learning more about the specific conditions under which payoffs
improve, do not matter to, or impair task performance, and investigating how payoffs (and
opportunity costs) affect decision strategies and information processing".
Jenkins et al (1998) sampled all studies in several applied psychology journals from 1975-96
which reported detailed individual-level effects of monetary incentives (with control groups).
They found 47 studies and combined the results in a formal meta-analysis. Forty-one studies
measured the effect of increased pay on output ("performance quantity"), generally in clerical
tasks such as assembling erector sets or coding items. Most studies found significant increases in
output from higher incentive. Only six studies measured the quality of performance, and the
effects of increased incentive in those studies are quite weak. They also found that the level of
intrinsic motivation in the task did not seem to affect the size of the incentive effect, and that
simple laboratory studies understated incentive effects, relative to richer laboratory simulations
or field studies.
Applying the capital-labor-production metaphor
The capital-labor-production metaphor points naturally to several features of cognitive capital
and production requirements which, in turn, suggest interesting novel classes of experiments.
(By contrast, the pure labor theory suggests only that raising incentives may produce different
distributions of errors.) We mention four categories: Capital-labor substitution, capital formation,
task design, and capital transfer.
Capital-labor substitution: Capital and labor are substitutes in most physical production
processes. Similarly, cognitive capital and effortful thinking are productive substitutes in some
tasks. An example is the stagecoach problem: Find the least-cost series of nodes which connect
an initial node to a destination. People can solve problems in this class labor-intensively, by
enumerating all possible paths and choosing the lowest-cost one. If they know the dynamic
programming principle (i.e., they have that principle in their stock of cognitive capital) they can
substitute capital for labor by working backward from the destination. A high level of capital and
little labor will produce an answer as cheaply and accurately as a low level of capital and lots of
labor.
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A familiar, general example of capital substituting for labor is experience of subjects. Several
studies compare the effects on performance of experience with financial incentives. For example,
Jamal & Sunder (1991) find that both experience and financial incentive increase convergence to
competitive equilibrium in experimental commodity markets, and experience has a more
statistically reliable effect. Smith and Walker (1993) estimate that the effect of one session of
experience on the convergence of first-price auction bids around the (risk-neutral) Nash bidding
function is about the same as the effect of multiplying a base incentive by ten. Lo, Cooper and
Kagel (in press) were the first to suggest (based on their observations) that higher pay may
substitute for learning in games where learning effects are large. Notice that this insight cuts both
ways: It implies that paying subjects more may enable experimenters to induce faster learning (or
better thinking), speeding up the rate at which subjects master tasks and permitting more
complex designs. But it also implies that even poorly-motivated subjects may learn to perform
well with enough learning opportunity. In any case, a more thorough exploration of experience
versus incentives, going beyond the bounds of this paper, would certainly be useful.
Another example of capital-labor substitution is the effect of giving contextual labels to subjects'
choices. Contextual labels enable subjects to activate domain-specific heuristics or choice rules
(e.g., Sniezek, 1986). For example, logic problems like the "Wason 4-card problem", which
require subjects to recognize that P->Q is logically equivalent to not-Q -> not-P, are much easier
for subjects when placed in a familiar, practical context (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985), particularly
one which correspond to detection of cheating (Cosmides, 1985). In economics experiments,
Eger & Dickhaut (1982) report that accounting students did substantially better in a probability
judgment task (roughly equal to the improvement from higher incentive) when abstract labels
were replaced with an accounting context. Cooper et al (in press) did a study of signaling games
with `ratchet effects’, in which a productive firm manager who reports high output is penalized
by having an output quota ratcheted upward in the future. Using Chinese subjects (some of
whom were firm managers), they found that when contextual labels described the game actions
as production, quotas, etc., subjects learned some features of the pooling equilibrium more
rapidly. Cooper were perhaps also the first to suggest that pay might substitute for learning.
Natural labels are largely unexplored by experimental economists, mostly out of fear that natural
language creates a non-monetary utility for making choices which loosens control over
incentives (e.g., fewer subjects might choose "defect" in the prisoner's dilemma than would
choose a strategy blandly labelled "D" or "strategy 2"). Natural labelling certainly does run this
risk, but it might also enable subjects to use cognitive capital, reducing response error and
speeding up learning.
Capital formation: The capital metaphor suggests that nonfinancial determinants of capital
formation might be interesting to study. Three examples are between-session "learning",
communication, and instruction.
Experimental economists suspect that something important occurs between experimental
sessions: Subjects "digest" their experimental experience, perhaps talk to other subjects, and
articulate what they did and saw to friends who did not participate. Much of this learning may be
"implicit", meaning that subjects are learning things they are not aware of (which is a well-
documented phenomenon in cognitive psychology, e.g., Reber, 1989). Since this capital
formation takes place entirely outside the lab, and is therefore beyond the control and
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measurement of the experimenter, but some features of the process could be measured (e.g., by
unobtrusively observing or recording subjects as they discuss an experiment during a planned
break between sessions).
In most experiments, communication is restricted on the grounds that it is unrealistic, may
influence social values, or weakens control over a subject’s information. But if learning from
others (and from `teaching’ others) are ways of building capital, and one is interested in capital-
labor determinants of performance, then communication becomes a particularly interesting
variable. For example, allowing subjects to work in teams would, for some tasks, be an
interesting treatment variable.
Experimental instructions are unquestionably an important influence on capital formation.
Experimental economists usually try to write extremely simple and clear instructions as a kind of
optimal task design (see below). In some cases, however, simply instructing people about
decision rules-- giving away capital-- is one way to measure whether those rules are used
instinctively. For example, Camerer et al (1993) were interested in whether subjects used
backward induction in bargaining. One way to answer this question is to instruct some subjects
about backward induction and see whether they behave differently than uninstructed subjects.
Since they did, the difference is evidence that the backward induction analytical device was not
part of uninstructed subjects’ `capital’ (but could be easily acquired through simple instruction).
Task design: Tailoring production requirements to capital: Instructions typically describe
the details of the mapping from a subjects' choices to her payoff, without suggesting preferable
strategies, because the subjects' ability to discover optimal strategies is usually the focus of
inquiry. But since instructions convey production requirements to subjects, they can also
influence whether subjects are able to use their capital to produce effectively. Instructions are
often written with something like this kind of task design in mind. Computer displays are
designed so that important information is prominently displayed and visible (minimizing
attention requirements) and history is retrievable from a menu (minimizing memory
requirements). Subjects are sometimes given tables enabling them to compute mapping from
actions to payoffs, to simplify calculations they may not be able to do perfectly. Many
experimenters do such studies, fiddling with instructions until they are "clear". For example,
Smith and Walker (1993) write:
In a new experimental situation, if the experimenter finds that decision error is biased
enough to contradict the theory, then the first thing to question is the experimental
instructions and procedures. Can they be simplified? (p. 10)
They write that simplifying instructions "may help to reduce decision cost". In our framework,
instructions can convey production requirements more clearly, minimizing the additional capital
needed to perform well.
Capital transfer: The usefulness of cognitive capital in different productive tasks is an important
empirical question. Put in psychological terms, how well does training in one task transfer to
another?
There are many reasons to think transfer is low. Just as carpenters, chefs, and golfers use many
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specialized tools rather than a few all-purpose ones, evidence from cognitive psychology
suggests that a lot of knowledge comes in the form of memory for domain-specific facts or
decision rules customized to situations (in cognitive science this is sometimes called
"modularity"). For example, experts tend to have lots of knowledge about facts in some domain,
but the rules they infer from those facts are not easily generalized (e.g., Camerer and Johnson,
1991). Chess experts, for examples, have large `vocabularies’ of positions from famous games,
and know what move to play from each position, but the high-level rules they induce from their
knowledge ("defend the center", "protect your king") do not generalize well to other domains.
More generally, there is little evidence that well-educated subjects perform experimental tasks
much differently than less-educated ones (see Ball & Cech, l996). In addition, subjects trained to
use a heuristic which is optimal in problems with certain surface features often fail to apply the
same heuristic when faced with new problems that are structurally-identical but have different
surface features. For example, Kagel & Levin (1986) found that subjects gradually reduced their
bids in repeated three-person common-value auctions, so they learned to mostly avoid the
"winner's curse". Then the number of bidders was changed to six. If subjects had learned the
structural reason for the winner's curse-- choosing the highest bid tends to select the most
optimistic common-value estimate-- they would reduce their bids when the number of bidders
rises, but instead they raised their bids. The data suggest that what subjects learned in the three-
bidder case (their cognitive capital) was customized to that situation, and did not transfer well to
the six-bidder case. 
A final thought: Further research on the capital-labor theory would benefit greatly from a wider
range of data about decision processes than experimental economists usually collect. Smith and
Walker (1993) articulate a bias against studying cognitive processes which many economists
share:
One can think of z as the decision cost or effort (concentration, attention, thinking,
monitoring, reporting, acting) which the subject applies to the task presented by the
experimenter. Like quarks in particle physics we may have no direct measures of z, but
we look for traces of its effects on the choice of y...by manipulation of the experimental
procedures that affect z and thus y. (Emphasis ours).
We disagree because one can measure decision effort (z) more directly. Indeed, studies have
done precisely this using looking-up patterns (Camerer et al, 1993), response times (Wilcox,
1993), measures of recall (which proxy for the amount of decision effort expended in the first
place), verbal protocols, pupil dilation (e.g., Kahneman and Peavler, 1969), heart rate or galvanic
skin response (e.g., Dickhaut et al, 1997) and so forth.
IV. Stylized facts and provocative conjectures
The results compiled in Table 1 can be summarized as stylized facts or provocative conjectures.
1. Most studies do not show a clear improvement in mean performance. The most common result
is no effect on mean performance (see also Bonner, Young and Hastie, 1996, Tables 3-4). Of
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course, the failure to find a significant performance effect of incentive may be due to low
statistical power (which is difficult to judge without making power calculations for each study).
Aggregating a series of insignificant effects in a proper meta-analysis adds power and could
establish collective significance where simply counting studies, as we have done, would not.
Nonetheless, it is widely believed among economists-- perhaps even more so among non-
experimentalists-- that paying subjects will necessarily increase their effort and their
performance. The underpinning of this hypothesis was carefully articulated by Vernon Smith
(1976), who wrote (p. 277):
...it is often possible in simple-task experiments to get satisfactory results without
monetary rewards by using instructions to induce value by role-playing behavior (i.e.,
'think of yourself as making a profit of such and such when...')..but such game values are
likely to be weak, erratic, and easily dominated by transactions costs, and subjects may
be readily satiated with 'point' profits.
The last sentence summarizes the case against using hypothetical rewards, and in favor of using
money: Money is thought to be stronger in force, more reliable, and less satiable than
hypothetical rewards. The extent to which any given reward medium-- money, points, grades,
public announcement of scores-- have these features is an empirical question. Smith was
convinced about the special motivational properties of money after observing double auctions
which failed to converge sharply unless subjects were paid (Smith, 1962). But the claim that
nonfinancial rewards are weak and satiable in other tasks has not been as firmly established. It
may be that in double auctions, which require substantial training sessions and many periods of
stationary "Groundhog Day" replication, subjects tend to get especially tired or bored, and
money keeps their attention from flagging better than other rewards. However, this is not a
strong argument for always using money in tasks where fatigue and boredom are less likely to set
in.
The faith economists have in financial incentives is important because it influences all stages of
experimental methodology, reporting, and debate. For example, a search of the American
Economic Review from 1970-97 did not turn up a single published experimental study in which
subjects were not paid according to performance. Authors believe that referees will automatically
reject a study which uses only hypothetical-payment data, and the authors are probably correct.
Furthermore, seminar participants invariably criticize experimental evidence of violations of
rationality principles by conjecturing that if enough incentive were offered the violations would
disappear (ignorant of the fact that this conjecture has generally proved false). For example,
Aumann (1990) wrote:
It is sometimes asserted that game theory is not "descriptive" of the "real world", that
people don't really behave according to game-theoretic prescriptions. To back up such
assertions, some workers have conducted experiments using poorly motivated subjects,
subjects who do not understand what they are about and are paid off by pittances; as if
such experiments represented the real world. (p. xi).
This passage implies that subjects who are motivated by more than "pittances" will be
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described by game theory, even if lower-paid subjects do not. In fact, there is simply no
laboratory evidence for this claim, and plenty of evidence against it.
Since our review shows that payment does not always matter, we suggest a revised three-
part standard for judging results: Critics can insist that researchers use substantial incentives for
tasks which have shown substantial incentive effects in previous studies; authors can argue for
not using incentives if previous studies have established little effect; and in cases where previous
studies are ambiguous, authors must run at least one incentive condition. (The latter requirement
would also add to the body of literature establishing incentive effects, which is hardly conclusive
at this point.).
2. When incentives do affect performance, they often reduce the variance of responses (see
Smith and Walker, 1993). Incentives often reduce variance by reducing the number of extreme
outliers, probably caused by thoughtless, unmotivated subjects. Lower variance is important for
three reasons:
First, the fact that incentives lower variance might provide an important clue about how
incentives affect attention and reasoning, and consequently performance.
Second, if incentives reduce variation in responses, they improve statistical power and help
experimenters test predictions more effectively. Used for this purpose, increased incentive is
simply a way of producing higher-quality data and doing better science (like buying purer
chemicals or less reactive beakers to do better chemistry). Of course, other methods might work
the same magic more cheaply. Trimmed means and robust statistical methods also reduce the
influence of outliers. Higher-power tests (e.g., Forsythe et al, 1994), and power-optimized
experimental designs (El-Gamal and Palfrey, in press; Müller and Ponce De Leon, 1996),
increase the quality of inferences drawn from noisy data. Experimenters who use incentives
purely to reduce dispersion should adopt these other techniques as well.
Third, variance reduction can change group outcomes dramatically in some tasks, when
aggregate behavior is especially sensitive to decisions by outlying individuals. Creative tasks
(like R&D), in which discovery of a correct answer by one person implies a group discovery,
order-statistic coordination games (e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio & Beil, 1990) and asset markets in
which behavior depends sensitively on common knowledge of rationality (e.g., Smith, Suchanek
& Williams 1988) are examples: One unusual person might cause the group to behave unusually.
If high incentives reduce individual variance they may reduce variance in group behavior even
more dramatically; in those cases incentives will have a particularly strong treatment effect
which should probably not be ignored.
3. Incentive effects are comparable in magnitude to other kinds of treatment effects; and
incentives may be substitutes for, or complements with, other treatments.
The capital-labor-production theory emphasizes that while incentives do have effects, the effects
are often comparable in magnitude to the effects of capital and production variables. In a striking
example, Baker and Kirsch (1991) studied pain endurance of female students who held their
hands in cold water for 4-8 minutes. In an incentive condition the subjects earned $2 for lasting
four minutes and $1 for each additional minute of pain they could stand. In a coping condition
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they were instructed in how to deal with pain. Incentives did induce the students to withstand
more pain, but learning to cope increased their pain endurance as well. Coping skill is a capital
variable with a positive effect comparable to the effect of incentives.
Capital and task variables may also be substitutes or complements with incentives. For example,
many experimenters suspect that experience is a substitute for incentive. For example, Jamal &
Sunder (1991) found that incentives reduced the variance of prices in commodity double-
auctions with inexperienced subjects, but had little effect with experienced subjects. A
reasonable guess is that the effect on mean performance and reduced variance from one session
of experimental experience is roughly equivalent to the effect of doubling or tripling incentives.
Some studies show a more dramatic experience effect. Smith & Walker (1993) estimate that one
session of experience reduces the dispersion of bids around a Nash equilibrium bidding function
about as much as a twenty-fold increase in incentives. McKelvey & Ordeshook (1988) report
experience effects which are about equal to the effect of a hundred-fold increase in incentive in
Fiorina & Plott (1978). The substitutability of experience effects and incentive effects suggests
that the implicit requirement in experimental economics that subjects be paid according to
performance could be replaced with a requirement that experimenters who do not pay subjects
performance incentives at least report data from experienced subjects (which most do anyway).
Feedback is likely to be a complement with incentives because it is hard to imagine that
incentives alone, without feedback about the quality of previous decisions, would have much
effect; and the effect of feedback is likely to be stronger in the presence of incentives.
Incentives may interact with treatments in other ways too. Awasthi & Pratt (1991) found that
subjects of a certain kind (high in "perceptual differentiation", one measure of intelligence)
reduced their error rate by half with higher incentives, while other subjects did not improve at all.
Glucksberg (1962) found that incentives helped performance on easy problems but hurt
performance on hard problems. Schwartz (1982) found that high incentives reduced performance
only for subjects who had been pretrained (and, in his interpretation, had learned a `sterotypical’
response). Atkinson (1958) found that subjects performed better if they had a high measured
"need for achievement" (a proxy for intrinsic motivation). Our point is not that these types of
individual differences among people or among tasks should be the main focus of economics
experiments. But economists who vary incentive conditions because they presume incentives are
a highly predictive variable should also pay attention to task and personal variables.
4. In tasks with no performance standard, incentives seem to induce substitution away from
socially desirable or pleasurable behavior.
In tasks like allocation of money (dictator games), choosing among risky gambles, and perhaps
others, it appears that subjects act more generously and risk-preferring when payments are
hypothetical. If they behave this way because generosity and risk-taking are seen as socially
desirable, and social desirability depends to some extent on subject-experimenter interaction,
then incentives may be especially useful for minimizing these kinds of "demand effects" (cf.
Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, 1996b). Also, if one is interested in differences among
individuals (or groups) in social preference or risk-taking, then calibrating these "tastes" by
varying incentive may be a particularly effective way to use incentives (e.g., Andreoni and
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Miller, 1997), and a different use than to induce careful thought.
We end this list with a provocative conjecture:
5. There is no replicated study in which a theory of rational choice was rejected at low stakes in
favor of a well-specified behavioral alternative, and accepted at high stakes. The complaint that
subjects were insufficiently motivated often arises when a principle of rational choice--
transitivity, dominance, game-theoretic equilibrium, or perhaps self-interest-- appears to be
violated in favor of an alternative, more psychologically plausible, hypothesis. Critics and
referees very commonly assert that if the stakes were just high enough the rationality rejection
would disappear. While several studies have tried to make rationality violations disappear-- in
utility theory paradoxes, ultimatum bargaining, and voting experiments-- none have succeeded in
clearly overturning anomalies.
Because the intellectual stakes are so high when interesting anomalies are discovered, a limited
number of replications aimed at testing their robustness (to stakes, experience, etc.) are probably
still worthwhile. However, since all established anomalies have essentially survived these kinds
of hostile attacks, uninformed critics should quit talking as if simply raising the stakes would
make effects disappear. So far, that hasn’t proved true; and nothing in any sensible understanding
of human psychology suggests that it would.
V. Conclusion
We reviewed 74 experimental papers in which the level of financial performance-based incentive
given to subjects was varied. Our primary interest is in advancing the simmering debate in
experimental methodology about when subjects should be paid, and why.
The data show that incentives sometimes improve performance, but often don’t. This
unsurprising conclusion implies that we should immediately push beyond debating the
caricatured positions that incentives always help or never help. Adopting either position, or
pretending that others do, is empirically misguided and scientifically counterproductive. In our
view, the data show that higher levels of incentives have the largest effects in judgment and
decision tasks. Incentives improve performance in easy tasks that are effort-responsive, like
judgment, prediction, problem-solving, recalling items from memory, or clerical tasks.
Incentives sometimes hurt when problems are too difficult or when simple intuition or habit
provides an optimal answer and thinking harder makes things worse. In games, auctions, and
risky choices the most typical result is that incentives do not affect mean performance, but
incentives often reduce variance in responses. In situations where there is no clear standard of
performance, incentives often cause subjects to move away from favorable `self-presentation’
behavior toward more realistic choices. (For example, when they are actually paid, subjects who
dictate allocations of money to others are less generous and subjects choosing among gambles
take less risk.)
One way to comprehend these results is a "capital-labor-production theory" of cognition
(extending Smith and Walker, 1993). The capital-labor-production framework assumes that the
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`labor’ or mental effort subjects exert depends upon their intrinsic motivation and financial
incentives. But the effect of extra effort on performance also depends on their level of cognitive
`capital’-- know-how, heuristics, analytical skills, previous experience in the task, and so forth--
and its productive value for a specified task. Capital and labor can substitute: For example, a few
experiments suggest that one session of experimental experience has an effect roughly
comparable to (at least) tripling incentives.
Capital-labor-production theory provides a language for describing why incentives matter in
some tasks but not in others. Tasks which are easy require little capital, so subjects can perform
well with little motivation and paying extra will not help much. Tasks which are hard require too
much capital (which cannot be formed in the short run of an experiment), so the effect of labor
on performance can be low (or negative). Obviously, spelling out the details of the capital-labor
theory is a big project for another day. The main point is that to the extent incentive effects are
worth studying, the effects of capital-relevant treatment variables are worth studying too.
An obvious direction for future research is to ask about these effects in natural settings, such as
inside firms. Firms casually experiment with mixtures of incentive schemes all the time and
often have an implicit theory about the interplay of incentive, human capital, and task demands.
There is ample field evidence that incentives do alter behavior in ways predicted by theory, but
there is less evidence that firms offer the contracts they are predicted to (see Prendergast, in
press, for an authoritative review). The experimental data suggest that for easy or hard jobs, and
intrinsically motivated workers, marginal changes in incentives will not improve performance
much. However, for boring jobs, unmotivated workers, or tasks in which variance is bad,
incentives are likely to have positive effects. Of course, these generalizations abstract from
phenomena which are likely to loom larger in firms than in the lab-- for example, social
comparison among workers to the wages of others, dynamic "ratchet" effects in motivating
effects of incentives, and so forth. Another lesson from the lab is that the effects of incentive on
performance are comparable in magnitude (and often less than) the effects of experience,
individual differences, task difficulty, and so on. Firms might improve performance by
redesigning tasks to suit human capital as much as they can improve performance by raising
incentives.
Our review also suggests some revisions to experimental method. Currently it is essentially
impossible to report experimental research in economics journals if subjects have not been
financially motivated. We think this prohibition should be replaced by a three-part standard: (i)
Referees who would reject a paper purely on the grounds that subjects were not paid must cite a
preponderance of previous literature establishing that incentives affect behavior meaningfully, in
a task similar to that studied in the paper under consideration. (ii) Authors could defend the
practice of collecting data from unpaid subjects by pointing to previous research showing that
financial incentives did not matter in their task. (iii) For the many tasks where the data are
mixed, authors should be encouraged (or perhaps required) to run different incentive conditions.
(The latter requirement would build up a database of systematic observations rapidly-- in a sense,
it would spread the economic "tax" of finding out whether incentives do matter equally to all
experimentalists.) These rules should help point the debate where it should head-- away from
differences in implicit models of subject behavior and towards data.
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An open question is what results from the laboratory tell us about incentives in naturally-
occurring environments (e.g., wages in firms, taxation and subsidy for public choices). Our view
is that experiments measure only short-run effects, essentially holding capital fixed. The fact that
incentives often do not induce different (or better) performance in the lab may understate the
effect of incentives in natural settings, particularly if agents faced with incentive changes have a
chance to build up capital-- take classes, seek advice, or practice. In principle, different sorts of
experiments could be conducted in which subjects return repeatedly, or have a chance to invest
in capital as part of their experimental choices, to allow for long-run effects, and experimenters
interested in extrapolating to the outside world might consider running such experiments.
Finally, we cannot end a casual review of this sort without several caveats. Our sampling of
studies and classification of incentive levels, and effects, should certainly be done more
carefully. Besides the usual problems of meta-analysis, comparing incentive effects across
different experiments would benefit from putting all incentives on a single scale (say, 1997
dollars per choice) and tying response rates to incentive levels, perhaps with some kind of
general stochastic choice function.
There are many other questions about uses of financial incentives in experiments which our
review does not address.
The lottery ticket procedure: There is some debate about whether paying subjects in functions of
units of probability (the "binary lottery" procedure) induces controlled risk tastes reliably. The
procedure should work in theory, if subjects reduce compound lotteries and maximize their
chance of winning a fixed prize, but the evidence suggests it does not work so well in practice
(e.g., Selten et al, 1995), or at best, works only in the aggregate for the minority of subjects who
obey reduction when directly tested (Prasnikar, 1998).
Losses: Because it is generally difficult to impose losses or punishments on subjects for
bureaucratic reasons-- university committees that approve protocols involving human subjects
strongly object to it-- we do not know how earning money and losing money differ
Paying a fraction of subjects: Another question we cannot answer is whether paying one out of N
subjects a larger stake, or paying subjects for one out of k high-stakes choices, provides as much
incentive as paying a lower stake for each choice. Some of the studies we reviewed do use these
random-payment schemes and it appears that these are roughly equivalent, at least for simple
choices (paying one out of N may even be more motivating, if subjects overweigh their chances
of being selected), but more careful exploration would be useful.
Tournaments: Finally, some experimenters use "tournament" incentives in which the returns to
performance are convex in performance or status-based (e.g., only the top few performers
receive large prizes). In theory, tournament incentives should induce more status-seeking and
risk-taking and hence, do not lead subjects to incentive-compatibly maximize expected profit
(which is why economists eschew them), but whether tournaments actually do have those
unintended effects has not been too carefully investigated.
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 Table 2: The number of studies exhibiting various incentive effects
 Type of task Helps  Has no effect  Hurts  Has an effect, but no
performance standard
JUDGMENTS & DECISIONS      
 Probability judgment  3  2    
  Binary choice (including
"three door" problem)
 2   1  
 Multivariate prediction  2   4   
  Problem solving  2   2   
  Item recognition/recall 3  3  1   
  Clerical (drawing, data
transfer, assembly)
 3   
 
 
  GAMES & MARKETS   
 
 
 
 
 Dominance-solvable games 1   
 Tournaments  1  1    
 Signaling games  1     
 Sequential bargaining    2   
 Ultimatum games   6   1 (fewer rejections of
fixed-% offers at
higher stakes)
31
 Trust games (labor markets,
centipede)
  2   
 Auctions: Double  3  1   
 Auctions: Private value  1   1 (Vickrey for gifts,
higher valuations)
 Auctions: Common value    1   
 Spatial voting    1   
 Duopoly, triopoly   1   
 INDIVIDUAL CHOICES      
 Dictator tasks     2 more self-interested
 Risky choices    3 8 more risk-averse, 2
more risk-seeking
 Non-EU choice patterns  1  1   
  Preference reversals   2  1   
 Consumer purchases     1 fewer actual
purchases
 Search (wages)    1    
 
                                           Table 1: Review of experiments measuring effects on financial incentives on performance
AUTHOR (YEAR) TASK INCENTIVES EFFECT OF HIGHER INCENTIVES
                                                  INCENTIVES IMPROVE MEAN PERFORMANCE
Ashton (1990,
groups 1-2)
Predicting company bond ratings (four categories)
from three numerical measures of financial
performance
0 vs. L($120.96
each for top 2 of
51 Ss)
Higher number of correct ratings (4.64 v 5.58).  Lower variance
(3.57 vs. 1.74).  Feedback, written justification raised number
correct too (5.55, 5.31).
Atkinson (1958) Arithmetic, drawing tasks L($5.10),
H($10.20) for high
score in groups of
N = 20,3,2, or top
3 of 4
Better performance (48.37 vs. 51.96, p<.01 L vs. H). Inverted
U-shaped effect of probability of winning (48.03, 51.39,
53.21,49.18). High “need for achievement” S’s do better.
Awasthi & Pratt
(1990)
Judgement problems: conjunction, sample size,
and sunk cost
0 vs. L ($2.42) Slight decline in error rate (.46 vs. .41). Reduced error more for
S’s high in “perceptual differentiation” .44 vs. .21.  More time
spent in L condition (4.2 v 5.7 mins). 
Camerer, Ho, Weigelt
(1997)
Dominance-solvable "beauty contest games"
measuring levels of iterated of dominace
L ($1/round) vs.
H($4/round)
Slightly closer to Nash equilibrium
Castellan (1969) Probability matching: Sequential betting on
independent draws of events (S’s should always
bet on the most likely event E, which has p(E)
chance).
L 3.96c/trial),
H (39.6c/trial)
Shift toward maximizing trials 81-180 (58% v 61%, p(E)=.6;
83% v 87%, p<.01, p(E)=.775)
Cooper, Kagel, Lo, and
Gu (in press)
Signaling games with output-quota ratchet effects.
Chinese students/managers subjects.
L (30 yuan/S) vs.
H (150 yuan/S);
(30 yuan=$3.75 at
official FX; mgrs
earn 100 yuan/day)
Higher frequency of strategic (pooling) choices (50% v 60%),
no difference in frequency of planner "mistakes" (66% vs.
69%).Effect diminished by experience, mimicked by instruction
context
Drago & Heywood
(1989)
Choice of decision number e in piece-rate and
rank-order labor. Incentive treatment is “flatness”
of expected payoff function.
L (8.81c gain from
e=0 to e*=37) vs.
H (84.4c gain)
Mean closer to prediction of 37 (48.7 v 37.2, round 12), lower
variance (964 vs. 51, round 12).
Glucksberg (1962) Easy problem-solving (with a helpful visual clue)
and recognition of familiar words.
0 vs. L (fastest
25% Ss $23.58
each, fastest S
$94.34)
Problem-solving: Faster (5.0 vs. 3.7 mins), more solutions (26
vs. 30). Word recognition: Faster (47.0 v 34.0 sec).
Grether (1980, 1992
exps 1-2)
Probability judgments of events and choice of
most-likely events, based on sample information.
0 vs. L($10 for
correct choice)
Similar non-Bayesian patterns, but incentive S’s less far from
Bayesian.  Fewer erroneous responses (12% v 4%).
(Some use of scoring rules.)
Harrison (1994) Choices of gambles to test EU theory ("Allais
paradox")
0 vs. L(EV=$.55-
$6.45)
Small reduction in Allais paradox (35% vs. 15%, conditions
AP0-AP1), statistically marginal (p=.14 two-tailed z-test).
Hogarth, Gibbs,
McKenzie & Marquis
(1991)
Prediction of stochastic outcome from two cues. 0 vs. L
(1.16c/point)
Higher accuracy when penalty function was “lenient” (small
weight on squared error in evaluation function), means 358 vs.
288 (experiment 1).
Jamal & Sunder (1991) Trading in commodity double auctions
(Treatments are incentives, trading experience of
subjects, and large/small number of traders.)
0 vs. L(1.16-
2.32c/point, $9.28-
13.91/session)
Sharper convergence to predicted equilibrium price with
incentives (p=.003), solely in markets with small number of
inexperienced Ss.
Kahneman & Peavler
(1969)
Remembering digit-noun pairs L (3.96c) vs.
H (19.8c)
Better memory (18% vs. 55%).  High incentive increased pupil
dilation.
Libby & Lipe (1991) Recall and recognition of items on a list of
accounting controls
0 vs. L(11.6c/item
+ bonus for top 5
Ss)
Better recall (9.8 vs. 12.0 items), no difference in recognition
(15.8 vs. 16.3).  More effort (1105 v 1281 secs).
Riedel, Nebeker &
Cooper (1988)
Transferring data from hand-written questionnaires
to scannable forms
0 vs. bonuses
($1.44 times
1,2,3,4,5 for
exceeding
5.75/hour)
Better performance in bonus groups vs. 0 (more quantity, fewer
errors, p<.001). No difference among levels of bonuses.
Salthouse, Rogan
& Prill (1984)
Recall of digits and letters in a “divided attention”
task: Two sequences, digits or letters. Total
incentive 4c/trial, incentives for each of the two 
sequences were ( x, 4-x), x from 0 to 4.
0 vs. L(5.95c/digit
or letter)
Better recall for high-incentive sequences (20% for 0, 80% for
4), experiment 1.
Scott, Farh &
Podsakoff (1988)
Assembly of frame-mat puzzles. 0 vs.
L($.079/assembly)
More work done (18.5 vs. 22.3, p<.001).  (O group paid L wage
but were “surprised” & told this only after doing the task.)
Siegel, Siegel &
Andrews (1964)
Probability matching 0 vs. L (22.99c if
right),
H(+22.99c)
Shift toward maximizing (70%, 77%, 93%)
Smith (1962) Trading in double auctions. 0 vs. L
(23.58c
payment/trade)
Sharper convergence to competitive equilibrium prices and
quantities.
Smith (1965) Trading in double auctions with excess supply
(competitive equilibrium gives sellers zero
surplus)
pL(4 of 27 Ss get
paid each period)
vs. L ($54.71
surplus per period
+ 22.61c per trade)
Sharper convergence to competitive equilibrium (mean
deviations $2.26 vs. $2.13 period 1, 63.3c vs. 9.04c period 4),
smaller variance in prices ($10.85 vs. 67.8c in period 4).
Smith & Walker
(1993)
Bidding in first-price private-value auctions Five levels:
$.58/auction times
0, 1, 5, 10, 20
More risk-aversion, lower variance of bids around linear
(constant relative risk-aversion) bid function.  Effect of 1
session of  bidding experience equal to incentive level of 20.
Wright &
Anderson (1989)
Probability judgement after being given a random
“anchor”.  Dependent variable is difference
between high- and low-anchor probabilities.
0 vs. L($371.44
total for top 45 of
77 S’s)
Less effect of anchoring (.235 v .160).  Lower standard
deviation (in 14 of 18 context-anchor level comparisons).
                                                  INCENTIVES HURT MEAN PERFORMANCE
Arkes, Dawes &
Christensen (1986)
Predicting student  honors  from grades. (S’s given
formula with 70% accuracy.)
0 vs. L ($.14/trial)
vs. L’($6.99 for
best of 16)
Lower accuracy (70 vs. 64% vs. 66%, control group). Incentive
S’s used formula less, did worse.
Ashton (1990) Predicting company bond ratings (four categories).
Subjects given decision aid (bond rating score)
0 vs. L($120.96
each for top 2 of
51 Ss)
Lower number of correct ratings (6.38 vs. 6.04). Higher
variance (1.85 vs. 3.35)
Friedman (1998) Deciding whether to switch chosen “door” in
“three-door” problem (switching is Bayesian)
L (+$.40/+$.10)
vs. H (+$1/-$.50)
Less switching at higher incentives (43.9 vs. 48.7, p=.00 to .10
in probit regressions)
Glucksberg (1962) Difficult  “insight” problem-solving (Duncker
candle problem) and recognition of familiar
(“church”) and unfamiliar (“vignette”) words
0 vs. L (fastest
25% Ss $23.58
each, fastest S
$94.34)
Problem-solving: Fewer solutions (22 vs. 16), slower (7.4 vs.
11.1 mins). Word  recognition: faster recognition for familiar
words (47 vs. 34 secs), slower for  unfamiliar words (151.9 vs.
199.8).
Grether & Plott (1979) Choice-pricing preference reversals over money
gambles
0 vs. L(EV from
$2.79-7.97)
Higher rate of reversals for P-bet choices (55.9% vs. 69.7%,
p=.05) (experiment 1).
Hogarth, Gibbs,
McKenzie & Marquis
(1991)
Prediction of stochastic outcome from two cues. 0 vs.
L(1.16c/point)
Lower accuracy when penalty function was “exacting” (high
weight on squared error in evaluation function), means 319 vs.
301 (experiment 1).
McGraw &
McCullers (1979)
Set-breaking problem (Luchins water jug): Nine
similar problems, followed by 10th different one. 
Dependent variable is performance on 10th.
0 vs. L ($.10 +
$2.07 if all answers
correct)
Slower solution time on 10th problem (181 sec v 289 sec).
(Difference not due to extra checking time, but to slower
identification of  “set-breaking” solution.)
Miller & Estes (1961) Identification of visual stimuli (two faces with
different eyebrows)
0 vs. L
($0.048/trial)
H ($2.38/trial)
More errors in L and H than 0 (21%, 32%, 34%).  No difference
in response times.  Ss were 9-year old boys.
Schwartz (1982) Learning rules governing which sequences of lever
presses are rewarded
0 vs.
L($.016/success)
vs. M($1.62 for
rule discovery) vs.
H(L and M)
Negative effect of trial-by-trial payoff  from L, H (63% of rules
discovered vs. 80% for 0, 83% M), for pretrained subjects only.
No effect for inexperienced subjects (95% rules discovered). Cf.
Merlo & Schotter (1997).
                                            INCENTIVES DO NOT AFFECT MEAN BEHAVIOR
Bohm (1994) Choice-pricing (Vickrey-auction buying price)
preference reversals over future money payments
(1072 Swedish  kroner in 3 mos. vs. 1290 SEK in
15 months)
0 vs. L(1/10
chance of getting
preferred choice,
or 10 Ss in Vickrey
auction, high
bidder wins)
Small, insignificant reduction in overall percentage of
preference reversals (choosing one claim but bidding more for
another), 19% vs. 29% (Table 1, finance students only).  Bigger
reduction in reversal for those who choose 3-month payment,
15% vs. 63%).
Bolle (1990) Ultimatum bargaining: Offer take-it-or-leave-it
part of amount X.  (Prediction = offer of $.01,
acceptance of any positive amount)
L(2.42DM),
H(24.2DM),
pL(p=1/10 of
24.2DM),
pH(p=1/10 of
242DM)
No difference in mean offers (41%, 36%, 41%, 45%) or lowest
amount accepted (38%, 33%, 28%, 32%).  (Note: (pL,L) and
(pH,H) have same expected payoffs but (pL,H) were more
similar).
Bull, Schotter &
Weigelt (1987)
Choices of decision numbers (simulating effort) in
rank-order labor “tournaments”
L (0-$1.96/trial),
H (0-$7.89/trial)
Decision numbers “did not differ” (fn. 8, no details reported)
Camerer (1987) Trading in double auctions for risky assets where
“representativeness” judgments can bias asset
prices
L($.475/asset) vs.
H($2.38/asset)
No difference in amount of  bias (.09 vs. .14 bias in 1-red
samples, .10 vs. .01 in 2-red samples)
Camerer (1989) Choices of gambles. 0 vs. L (expected
value $6.30)
No significant differences in risk-aversion or test-retest
reliability
Camerer (1990, p. 315) Ultimatum bargaining. pL (X=$12.17)
pH (X=$121.70)
(p=1/39)
No difference in offers (39% v 38%) or lowest amount accepted
(21% v 15%)
Cox & Grether (1996) Preference reversals: Discrepancies between
gamble choices and valuation (established using
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure or sealed-
bid auction, or English clock descending-price
auction).
0 vs. L (.5 of H)
vs. H(mean $60.57
for 1-1/2 hrs)
No difference between rates of predicted and unpredicted
reversals using BDM (60%,73%, 46%, period 1), small
difference in second-price auction (37%,76%,73%), opposite
difference in English clock auction (93%, 79%, 47%). 
Repetition eliminates predicted PR in second-price auction
(0,29%,27% in round 5), English clock auction only in L,H
 conditions. L and H S’s more risk-averse (46% v 54%). No
difference in intransitivity (16% 0 vs. 11% for L-H).
Craik & Tulving (1975) Learning to remember words L(2.76c) M(8.29c),
H(16.6c)
No effect on amount of accurate recall (65%, 64%, 66%,
experiment 10)
Fehr and Tougareva
(1996)
Choices of wages and efforts in experimental labor
market
L (up to $1/period)
vs. H(up to
$10/period)
No effect on average wage, worker effort, or slope of effort-
wage relation (.0074 vs. .0072). Average subject income
$17/month (Russians).
Fiorina & Plott (1978) 5-person committee choices of a two-dimensional
point (cf. Kormendi & Plott, 1980)
L(2.3-11.6c/unit)
H($2.32-
$6.96/unit)
Marginally significant reduction in deviation of averaged data
from the core  (2.5 units v 1, p=.08 and .11 on different
dimensions by Epps-Singleton test).  Reduction in % of  points
outside near-core region (p=.06).  Less variance (20 vs. 7).
Fouraker & Siegel
(1963)
Duopoly and triopoly quantity choices (Cournot) L vs. H($37.27,
23.29, 9.32 bonus
to top 3)
No difference in mean or variance of profits.
Forsythe et al (1994) Ultimatum bargaining 0 vs. L ($5.36) vs.
H ($10.73)
No difference in offers or lowest amount accepted.  Less cross-
session variance.  Mean offers 40%, 45%, 47%
Guth, Schmittberger &
Schwarze (1982)
Ultimatum bargaining L (1.62 DM)
H (16.2 DM)
No difference in offers or lowest amount accepted
Hey (1982, 1987) Search: Decisions about which price to accept
from a sequence of prices
0 vs. L (expected
£8.15)
No significant effect on amount of optimal stopping (25% vs.
33%) or apparent search rules
Hoffman, McCabe &
Smith (1996a)
Ultimatum bargaining L ($10.73/pair) vs.
H($107.27/pair)
No significant difference (contest/exchange, mean offer 31% vs.
28%, mean rejected offer 20% vs. 18%; random, mean offer
44% vs. 44%, mean rejected offer 35% vs. 40%)
Irwin, McClelland,
McKee, Schulze &
Norden (in press)
Bids for $3 ticket elicited by Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak method with different penalties for
suboptimality
L(1c for $1 error)
vs. H(20c for $1
error)
No significant effect on mean deviation from truthful bidding
($.62 vs. $.50) (experiment 2, full information)
Kahneman,
Peavler &
Onuska (1968)
Mental arithmetic: Remembering four-digit strings
and adding 0 or 1 to each digit
L (8.26c)
H (41.3c)
No effect on accuracy (88% vs. 82%).  Increased pupil dilation
in easier add-0 condition.
Loomes & Taylor
(1992)
Choices over 3 gamble pairs (are there regret-
induced intransitive cycles?)
0 vs. L
(EV=£4.22)
No difference, 21.6% cycles vs. 18.5% cycles.
McKelvey & Palfrey
(1992)
Choices in multi-stage "centipede games" L ($.20-$) vs. H
($.60-$24)
No significant difference (.06 vs. .15 equilibrium taking at first
node).
Neelin,
Sonnenschein &
Spiegel (1988)
Sequential bargaining: Subjects alternate offers
dividing a “shrinking pie” of size X across five
rounds.
L(X=$6.56) vs.
H(X=$19.69)
No difference in mean percentage of X offered (34% v 34%) or
mean offer rejected (26% vs. 30%).
Nilsson (1987) Recall and recognition of words 0 vs. L ($13.58 for
best S, n=10)
No difference in recall (35% vs. 33%) or recognition (58% v
55%).  Incentive S’s self-reported working harder.
Roth, Prasnikar,
Okuno- Fujiwara,
Zamir (1991)
Ultimatum bargaining L($11.60/pair) vs.
H($34.79/pair)
No difference in ultimatum games (median 48-50% in rounds 1,
10 for both L,H).  Small, insignificant difference in “market”
games with 9 proposers competing (median 58% vs. 78%).
Samuelson & Buyers bidding against an informed seller 0 vs. L(+$7.19 to - No effect on median, modal bid (=50, version 3, compare
Bazerman (1985) (“acquire-a-company” problem) $14.39) Figures 3, 10a).
Siegel & Fouraker
(1960)                          
  
Buyer-seller bargaining over price-quantity pairs. 
(Incentive is differential between Pareto-optimal
and adjacent-quantity outcome)
L(48.5c-77.65c
difference) vs.
H($2.91)
No significant difference in mean profit (266.92c vs. 43.68c). 
Much lower variance (2426c vs. 92.21c).
Straub & Murnighan
(1995)
Ultimatum offers and acceptance thresholds,
complete and partial information (responders do
not know pie size)
pL($10.47pie)
times 1,3,5,8,10.
(Prob of playing
p=2/1813)
No significant difference in mean offers (31% to 26% for
multiplier 1 to 10) or mean acceptance thresholds (19% vs.
20%).
Wallsten, Budescu &
Zwick (1993)
Probability judgments using numerical or verbal
expressions
0 vs. L (Total $20
bonus for top 4 of
7 S’s)
No significant difference in accuracy (measured by an incentive-
compatible spherical scoring rule).  Some difference in positive
(P) and negative (N) conditions (P,N guarantee >0, <0 payoffs
for stating probability .5).
Weber et al (1997) Trading risky assets in double auctions with
different endowment conditions
(long, neutral, short).
0 vs. L (EV
.22DM/unit) vs. H
(EV 2.20DM/unit)
"no difference in market prices" (p 17)
    INCENTIVES AFFECT BEHAVIOR,  BUT
NO PERFORMANCE  STANDARD
Battalio, Jiranyakul &
Kagel (1990)
Choice  of  gambles More risk-averse
Beattie & Loomes
(1997)
Choice of  gambles 0 vs. pL (1/4
chance) vs. L (EV
£3 to £7.81)
No difference (q's 1-3); no difference in "common ratio effect";
 more risk-aversion (q 4; 36%, 22%,8%)
Binswanger (1980) Choice of gambles (by poor Indian farmers)  0 vs. L(EV 86.54
rupees = .2% of
average Ss wealth)
More risk-aversion at higher stakes, .86, 8.65, 86.54 rupees. No
difference in mean risk-aversion, hypothetical vs. real 86.54
rupees (p. 398). Hypothetical choices more dispersed.
Cubitt, Starmer &
Sugden (1998)
Choice of gambles 0 vs. L (EV from
£2.5 to 12)
More risk-risk-averse (50% vs. 60%, groups 3.1-3.2)
Edwards (1953) Choice of gambles (p,$X) with pX held constant 0 vs. H(pX=53c,
0,- 53c)
More risk-seeking. Larger deviations from EV and EU
maximization for bets with pX=53c or 0. Fewer intransitivities.
Forsythe et al (1994) Dictator  “games" (one person divides $10.73
between self & other)
0 vs. L ($5.36) vs.
H ($10.73)
More self-interested offers (50% offer half and 15% offer 0 vs.
20% offer half and 35% offer 0).  Means 48%, 28%, 23%
Grether & Plott (1979) Choice of gambles 0 vs. L (EV from
$2.79 to 7.97)
More risk-seeking (p<.01) (experiment 1)
Cummings, Harrison &
Rutström (1995)
Choice of whether to buy consumer products 0 vs. L (hyp’l vs.
actual purchase)
Fewer purchases (9% vs. 31%).
Hogarth &
Einhorn (1990)
Choice of gambles L(EV=$.12) vs.
H(EV=$12.10)
More risk-averse (40% vs. 73% gains, 24% vs. 36% losses).
(experiment 3)
Irwin, McClelland &
Schulze (1992)
Vickrey auctions for insurance against risky losses 0 vs. L(.011,
-$45.06)
More risk-averse: Median bids higher, fewer zero bids and very
high bids
Kachelmeier & Shehata
(1992)
Choice of gambles (Canadian & Chinese students:
67.58 yuan=monthly income)
L(1.13 yuan) vs.
H(11.26 yuan)
More risk-averse (certainty- equivalents higher than expected
value for L incentive). Both L and H overweight low winning
probabilities.
List & Shogren (1998) Valuations of received Christmas gifts O vs. L(4th-price
Vickrey auction for
244 gifts)
Higher valuations in actual auction ($96 vs. $137).
Sefton (1992) Dictator games 0 vs. pL(1/4
chance of playing)
vs. L($5.63/pair)
More self-interested offers in L condition, means $2.15, $2.06,
$1.23 (0,pL the same, both significantly different from L).
Schoemaker (1990) Choice of gambles 0 vs. pL(7/242 Slightly more risk-averse (75% vs. 77% gains, 23% vs. 34%
chance of  playing
EV=$60.48, -
60.48)
losses, p=.20)
Slonim & Roth (1998) Ultimatum bargaining L ($1.90),
M($9.70),
H($48.4)
Rejection rates of percentage offers lower with increased stakes
(44%, 19%, 13% for offers 25-40%), p(M vs. L)=.04, p(H vs.
L)=.002)  Bargaining in Slovak crowns (60,300, 1500).
Slovic (1969) Choice of gambles 0 vs. L(EV $7.12) More risk-averse (p<.01)
INCENTIVE EFFECTS ARE CONFOUNDED
WITH  EFFECTS OF OTHER TREATMENTS
Bahrick (1954) Learning names of geometric forms; peripheral
learning of colors is worse.  (Incentive paid for
form learning only.) 0 subjects told not to try hard.
0 vs. L (max
$8.55)
Faster learning of forms (16.9 trials v 19.6); worse learning of
colors (6.1 v 7.6)
Baumeister (1984) Physical game of hand-eye coordination: Moving
two rods so a ball rolls between them, then
dropping the ball into a slot. (Confound between
incentive and stated performance goal.)
0 vs.
L($1.49/trial)
Worse scores in first trial (33.6 vs. 28.3), same scores in second
trial (34.1 vs. 33.2). No variances reported.
Eger & Dickhaut
(1982)
Posterior probability judgment; searching for
evidence of “conservatism” in Bayesian updating.
(Confound between incentive and elicitation
technique.  No-incentive Ss give odds, incentive
Ss pick “payoff tables” which E bets against.)
0 vs. L ($64.66,
$40.41, $24.25 for
top 3 S’s in each
group of 9-10).
Reduced judgement error (conservatism), measured by slope of
log odds against log Bayesian odds (.63 vs. 1.04).  Less error in
accounting vs. abstract context.
Fouraker & Siegel
(1963 exps 3-5)
Buyer-seller bargaining over price and quantity. 
(Confound between incentive and experience: H
trial was 21st of 21 trials.)
L vs. H No difference in mean prices or quantities.  Variance 1-4 times
smaller.
Kroll et al (1988) Investing in risky assets.  (Confound between
higher incentive and risk-aversion)
L vs. H More risk-averse, closer to optimal portfolio, work harder.
Phillips & Edwards
(1966)
Posterior probability judgement.  (Confound
between incentive and use of two proper and one
improper scoring rules)
0 vs. L ($.44
max/trial)
Lower Bayesian errors (30% lower).  Lower cross-S variance
(.005 vs. .012).
Slovic & MacPhillarny
(1974)
Multicue prediction with missing values (e.g.,
admitting students who each have two test scores,
with only one test in common) (Confound between
incentive and trial-by-trial feedback, missing cue
distribution information.)
0 vs. L (max
$12.18)
No difference in fraction of S's weighting common test more
heavily (70%, 77%)
Wright & Aboull-Ezz
(1988)
Judgements of probability distribution of GMAT,
age, and salary of MBA students. (Confound
0 vs. L ($157.48
total for 10 best
Lower mean squared error (.007 vs. .004).  Lower cross-S
variance (half in L)
between incentive and use and explanation of
scoring rule.)
S’s, n=51)

